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Supposing the main things about Portugal from a US point of view to be: (a) its location (which is part of the same picture with Spain); (b) its colonial possessions, some of them geographically more important than the country itself; (c) its government, which is anti-communist if not pro-US and supposing that either economically, as a military threat, or as center on a possibly dangerous alliance, Portugal doesn't mean a thing. The main desideratum, then, would be a government that would continue favorable to the US to the extent that we could do what we wanted to with the Azores and Madeiras and wouldn't be opposed if, by any chance, we should have to have bases in Portugal.

If something like this is so, the main question, at least in the first part of the paper, would be the stability of the government. Elections, though discussed under the Stability section, evidently have no bearing on the subject. The only two chances seem to be overthrow by the army, or by a popular uprising. As to the first, though it is stated flatly that Salazar's regime is entirely dependent on army support, no clear statement is given on the army's attitude. There are allusions to mild dissatisfaction and references to Salazar's careful handling of army opponents, but there is nothing to show whether the army can be trusted for an indefinite time not to attempt a coup, nothing to show how successful the Army might be and under what circumstances if so; or, supposing it succeeded, what kind of regime it would put in.

As to the masses, a definite impression is left that whatever

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injustices they may suffer, they are inarticulate and powerless. It is stated that they would be susceptible to communist organizers, if the Communists could reach them. It is also to be presumed that the hold of the Church would be sufficient to keep them in line in any case. Even so, since the two million or so peasants are one of the few potential dangers to the government, it would seem to be advisable to discuss them further and make plain exactly what their position is.

The other point that ought not to be omitted concerns what would happen if Salazar were suddenly eliminated. This would seem of unusual importance here because not only is Salazar sole dictator, but he built the dictatorship single-handed. From a reading of this paper, one could only conclude that if Salazar were to die suddenly, there might well be chaos which, for all one knows, would end in a regime idstressingly unfavorable to the US.

The political section in general seems to describe the government without in any way analysing it. The government seems to be a garden variety of dictatorship with all the usual features, and these features doubtless ought to be briefly described, but more interesting would be such factors as the actual hold of the dictatorship over the people; its chances of survival (as above); its real sources of power; or the aims of the dictator and his sincerity in them.

In foreign affairs, one of the central issues would seem to be the matter of Salazar and Fascism. It is evident that the reason why Salazar does not share Franco's unsplendid isolation is that he did not make so much noise about pro-fascist leanings during the war,

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probably because he was not important enough to do so. Nevertheless, it should be event to anyone, particularly to anyone who read this report, that the above is practically the only difference between Franco and Salazar internationally. It ought to be particularly easy for the USSR to embarrass the US in any relations with Portugal, and the paper says the USSR isn't overlooking the opportunity. More discussion of the matter, particularly as it relates to the ECA, might help. The other matter that is not made as clear as it might be here is the interesting strategy of substituting the US as protector of Portugal vice the UK. This would seem extremely vital in this paper, considering what it would involve, and it would seem to be something with a good many angles. For example, in spite of its possibly over-publicized post-war weaknesses, would the UK be entirely happy to see this happen? What would it cost the US, and what would be the value received? Is Portugal entirely persuaded to this point of view, or is it simply something Salazar is contemplating?

Should think that strategically the discussion should center around what could be done by the US or USSR with Portuguese territory. Hardly seems that economic or military considerations even need mention. Also suspect that ~~uranium~~ <sup>plutonium</sup> may deserve more attention than it gets. Should think a conference with the Science Branch might elicit exactly to what extent Portuguese deposits should be watched for our use or denial to the USSR.

The Future Developments ought to be reconsidered. The last paragraph doesn't even belong in this section.

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In general, the report is rather loosely written, particularly in the matter of coherence.

#### IN PARTICULAR

1. P. 1-2-5 to 6. There are sixteen lines on the Portuguese colonies. This seems rather skimpy for a ranking colonial power. The empire is rated at 800,000 square miles, but the colonies in question are not specified. How, for instance, would the efficiency of the Lisbon government in Macao compare with that in Madeira? Is the native unrest mentioned likely to have any effect on Portugal's hold over its colonies? The empire in general could stand a great deal of discussion somewhere, even if it had to become a separate section. Even Timor might become strategically important some day. What would happen to the colonies if Portugal were overrun by the USSR?

2. I-3-1 to 5. This reader was frankly lost. The party alignment looks like Turkey and Argentina where Ataturk and Peron respectively decided that their elections might look a little better and that there might even be some salutary effect on the electorate if the dictator's party had an Opposition. So both of them, particularly Ataturk, created an opposition and told it to oppose, making it pretty clear that it had better not do so too seriously. Evidently Salazar, like Peron, found the Opposition a bit too eager and had to hamstring it.

Salazar, however, seems to have other opposition, whose standing

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and intentions are not made clear. The military opposition, in particular, treated in ten inconclusive lines would seem to deserve more attention. If, for instance, they were capable of an attempted coup two years ago, and if there is latent dissatisfaction; then even though the leaders are in jail, it would seem that the regime was not absolutely secure in face of the fact that it rests on military support.

Should also like to see the civil opposition straightened out and better evaluated.

(For an example of the kind of writing that probably should not appear even on a Situation Report, see top paragraph p. I-3-4)

3. P. I-4-1 to 2. The same can be said about this. The army and church are apparently of enormous importance, but it's hard to find anything very illuminating about either in these 400 words.

Section III. Here occurs the first, and as far as we noted, the only reference to the Lagens airbase, and it certainly is cursory. One would have thought airbases in the Atlantic islands were from a US point of view one of the few points of importance the Portuguese offered. In the past, the NSC has expressed an interest in them and it has never said anything else we can remember on anything touching Portuguese affairs.

Seems in general as if most of the major points of foreign policy are probably touched on here, but the field still doesn't seem to be covered. There are too many vague generalisations such as the parochial mentality of some Portuguese; the Portuguese feeling

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that there is going to be war in which like-minded people should line up together, and the rest. Chapter should first endeavor to determine the real bases of Portuguese foreign policy: what Salazar wants and what he is willing to do to get it, based on Portuguese traditions and present needs, and proceed from there to apply the doctrine to major countries or complexes involved.

Sections V and VI. These, as said above, ought to be reconsidered. G/AS, which is supposed to have a part in these sections, might be consulted if the authors liked. Generally speaking, it seems to have helped in other branches to work out these especially important sections in consultation with a group of those interested in the area, outside ORE as well as in it.

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